

Institutional Study Of Fisheries Community Pengambeg In Puger Wetan Village, Sub-District Puger, Jember City

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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to describe the conditions that existed at the time the research was conducted and examine cause and effect through the identification of existing symptoms of the problem. Through a descriptive qualitative approach, where fishermen in Puger Wetan Village become the analytical part of this study, it is known that the pengambeg and fishing communities have institutional relationships that have been formed from time to time. The institutional function of the pengambeg and fishermen in Puger Wetan Village, Puger District, Jember Regency has a very important role for the sustainability of the marine fishing industry, seen from the stability of supply, the lack of ambitiousness and the sustainability of fishermen's lives. This research contribution can be used as a reference for the government in determining policies for the lives of fishermen in Puger Wetan Village.

Keywords: Fishermen, Institutional, Pengambek

1. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is a maritime country that has an area of waters reaching 3.25 million km² or around 63 percent of Indonesia's territory and has a coastline of 95,181 km. The magnitude of Indonesia's fisheries potential has not been able to make the fisheries sector become one of the potential real sectors in Indonesia. The potential of the sea owned by Indonesia has not been utilized maximally and evenly, especially for the welfare of society at large. People who live around the coast, especially those on small islands, depend on marine resources for their livelihood as fishermen. However, different facts occur on the condition of fishermen as the main actors in the use of natural resources of the waters and fisheries, the coastal areas with marine activities, both fishermen and the cultivation of fish in the sea are very synonymous with poverty. Fishermen are people who actively carry out work in fishing operations and other aquatic animals or aquatic plants. The level of fishermen's welfare is determined by the catch. The number of catches can reflect the amount of income received and the income is mostly for the needs of family consumption or minimum physical needs. The problem of fishing poverty is a multidimensional problem so that to solve it requires a comprehensive solution, and not a partial solution (Suharto, 2005). According to Nasikun (2001) Poverty is a multifaceted, multidimensional, and integrated phenomenon. Living in poverty does not only mean living in a condition of lack of clothing, food and shelter. Living in poverty often also means low access to a variety of productive resources and assets that are needed to be able to obtain the means to fulfill the most basic needs of life, including: information, science, technology and capital. There are several aspects that cause the maintenance of poverty of fishermen or coastal communities, including; Government policies that do not favor the poor, many policies related to poverty reduction are top down and always make society an object, not a subject. Conditions that depend on the season are very influential on the level of welfare of fishermen, sometimes several weeks fishermen do not go to sea due to uncertain seasons. The low level of Human Resources (HR) and equipment used by fishermen have an effect on the way in fishing, limitations in understanding technology, making quality and

quantity of catches not improved. Poverty of fishermen is considered to be widespread with a deep level of poverty that is of concern. Simultaneous cultural and structural analysis is needed to provide a way out in alleviating fisherman poverty. Jember Regency East Java has a coastal area. However, the condition of poverty is still very prominent for most of the coastal communities of Puger Wetan who work as fishermen. Puger Wetan Village is one of the villages in Puger District. This village is approximately 30 km from the capital of Jember district towards the south. The social structure of fishermen in Puger is divided into several levels, namely: owner fishermen (landlords), skipper, and pandhega (ABK). But there are also some boat owners who also double as skipper. In carrying out fishing operations, Puger fishermen only rely on good / bright weather and calm waves. Knowledge and expertise about fishing ground is obtained based on long working experience so that you can get catches quickly. In addition, there are also many fishermen who know the fishing information (fishing ground) through the Global Positioning System and navigation maps that show the latitude and depth of a waters. Most of Puger Wetan coastal fishermen live in poor conditions. The people of Puger Wetan Village have 268 poor households while the Poor Population is 530 families. The conditions and phenomena of poverty provide an understanding and thought of the importance of conducting a study of poverty and poverty issues need to be studied further so that it can be understood precisely the background causes of the problem of poverty, therefore it is necessary to research the problem of poverty in this area and its causes. the cause.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Institutional Theory

In the field of institutional politics many emphasize the rules of the game (the rules) and collective action for the common or public interests. Psychology looks at institutions from the point of view of human behavior (behavior). Law emphasizes the importance of institutions in terms of law, rules and law enforcement as well as instruments and litigation processes. The approach of biology, ecology or the environment looks at the institution from the point of

view of the analysis of the ecosystem system or production system by emphasizing the structure and function of the production system or environmental system then can be analyzed the output and performance of the system in several characteristics or performance (system performance or system properties such as productivity, stability, sustainability, spread and evenness. Economics that develops in its new branch of new institutional economics (neo-institutional economics) 1 sees institutions in terms of transaction costs and collective action. In the analysis of transaction costs, it includes an analysis of ownership and mastery of natural resources or factors of production (property rights), imbalance of access and mastery of information (information asymmetry) and opportunistic behavior (opportunistic behavior). The economics of new institutions are often referred to as transaction costs economics, while others refer to them as imperfect information paradigms (Stiglitz, 1986). Studying institutions (or organizations) is essential, because modern society operates in organizations. Each individual behavior can always be interpreted as a representative of the group. All our lives are carried out in organizations, from birth, work, to death (Etzioni, 1985: 1). That is the reason why we have to study the institutions, as also stated by Mancur Olson (1971, 5) Most of all (no means all) is taken through an organization, it will be helpful to consider an organization in a general or theoretical way.

2.2 Institution as the Main Rules

Bogason (2000) states that there are three level rules, namely action level, collective action level, and constitution level. At the action level, it directly depends on real action. In this case there are usually standards or rules of behavior. At the level of collective action, we will determine the rules for future actions. These rules-setting activities are often also called policies. Finally, at the level of the constitution we determine the principles for future future decision making, such as the principles of democracy. The rules at the constitution level are officially written and codified. So the constitution is not a fixed price, it is usually more difficult to change. Bomerly (1989) states that the basic rules of general rules are more formal (enforced by government authorities) and written authority. However, there are also protection that is not officially written or not codified. and understanding about the tools for resolving conflicts within the structure.

2.3 Institutional As a Arrangement of Ownership Relations

As a regulation of ownership relations, institutions are considered as social arrangements that regulate: (1) individuals or groups of owners, (2) value objects for owners and others, and (3) people and other parties involved in ownership (Deliarnov, 2006). Alchian (1993) states that there are three main elements of ownership rights, namely (1) exclusive rights to choose the use of a resource, (2) the right to exchange resources owned according to agreed conditions. From this description, it is implied that who owns a resource has the right to control the use of these resources. Up to certain limits this can be justified. Likewise, a person is not free to do what he likes for his goods, because how he treats and uses these resources is valued by the community.

2.4 Patron-Client Relationship Pattern Structure

There are differences in cooperation in patron-client relationships, one of the coworkers is in a higher position, where he has the power to allow him to become a patron for others. Patron is someone who combines status, strength, influence, a symbol of strength for others in defending themselves or helping others to protect themselves. For someone who is lower in position and receives the power and influence that a patron has is called a client. Patron-client relationships are not taken for granted by an individual, but must be created (Foster, 1967). Patron-client relations occur in people who have different socio-economic status, who exchange between different goods and services. Patron is considered by many experts to be a place of refuge from arbitrariness to obtain economic assistance. A client who relies on the protection of a patron is obliged to be a loyal subordinate and always ready to do whatever work is given to him (Blau, 1996). The pattern of patron-client relationships is not limited to buying and selling activities, but includes various other aspects of life. Patron contributes to the provision of production facilities for clients. In addition, someone who has been able to lend to another person or group can be categorized as a patron, so that the patron at the time of famine has the obligation to provide additional loans or fulfill the life needs of the fisherman (client). The beginnings of fishermen becoming attached to patrons are generally due to lack of capital to do their own business. Patron is willing to help provide capital in the form of money or production facilities (boats, fishing gear and machinery). The loan capital from the given patron is a bond for fishermen as the first step in conducting a patron-client relationship. In general, fishermen tend to look for sources of capital loans to ignorant people and feel reluctant to borrow from formal financial institutions.

2.5 Patterns of Relationship between Observer (Patron) and Juragan (Client)

In a fishing community, someone who has financial capacity and has provided loans to certain people for procurement in the form of vessels, machinery, fishing gear or capital for other needs related to fishing business such as supplies, fuel oil, then someone the one who had given the loan was called a Pangambeg. Whereas someone who has an fishing business with completeness such as a boat with a crew (pandega), a machine and fishing gear that is held with all of his own funds, or from a loan fund from a pengekek either partially or wholly, then someone who already has the fishing business referred to as skipper. The background of the job of the Pangambeg was initially the same as that of the boss, namely as a fisherman or related to the work of their parents before. Even so, there were also scoffers who had indeed started working as pengambek since the first time. There was a tendency that pengambek was one of the top layers in the membership of the fishing community, and had a strong influence especially in relation to fisheries. The relationship between pangambeg and skipper is more important only in terms of fish marketing alone, as a result of the debt of the skipper to the pengambeg. But it does not rule out the possibility of a wider relationship with the provision of production facilities in the event of damage or theft of machinery. The obligation

of the skipper as a client is to sell the catch to the pengekek. Compared to the customer, the skipper will get a bigger profit if he can sell his catch to other pengambang. However, this cannot be done because it has been bound by debt to the customer of the sniper. If this is violated or it is known that the skipper has sold his catch to other customers who are not subscribers, then as the penalty is a patron-client relationship between the patron and the owner becomes disconnected and the owner is obliged to return the entire loan to the customer. In general, a new patron will undertake to provide a loan to the client (client) to return it to the old pengambang. There is no clarity about the price of fish, because it is determined unilaterally by the pengambang. The bondage of the skipper to the pengambang is not only because of the debt bond, but also because the boss feels difficulty in marketing his catch. This is caused by busy working and spending time in the middle of the sea to catch fish, so the skipper does not have effective access to sell his catch to the market. The delay in marketing the catch will only reduce the quality of fish products which means a decrease in selling prices or cause losses. This tendency was responded to well by pengekek so they took over the role of marketing the fish catches from the skipper. Some of the profits of the skipper in the position as a client of a scamper are that the skipper can immediately obtain a loan from a scout, the skipper feels he can share the risk with the scamper if his fishing effort fails or is unsuccessful as a disaster or other unfavorable conditions by not paying the entire loan to the pengambang but divided in two or even released. While the disadvantages include dependence that is getting bigger and bigger from the skipper to the scavenger, which at the same time will position the skipper to be difficult in expanding the business or increasing his status to become a bigger skipper. Because the possibility to expand the business can only be done on the same scavenger, which of course will not provide loans in an irrational amount according to the opinion of the scoundrel.

2.6 Relationship Patterns of Skipper (Patron) and Pandega (Client)

The relationship between the boss and the pandega in addition to the nature of work relations also has the obligation to provide capital assistance (money) and meet the needs of the pandega during the dry season. Debts given to the pandega skipper will never be asked to pay off until the pandega out of the work relationship with the boss. This system of giving debt and living necessities is done solely to bind the pandega to keep working with the skipper. Considering that getting a pandega workforce is felt very difficult, then the bosses compete with each other in maintaining the pandega they have so as not to move to another skipper. In addition, on the Idul Fitri feast, the boss gives a kind of allowance for money, clothing or sarongs to the pandega. The profit sharing system is based on the catch received. Each skipper has his own way of distribution with his staff, but generally using a "paro-system" (divided into two equals between juragan and pandega group, after deducting operational costs) does not get results; so that the boss must bear the fuel money for the arrest operation. The "paro system" has long been (1980s). According to the viewpoint of the pandega the profit sharing system is considered fair and beneficial to both parties, both pandega and juragan, because the

portion received by the skipper must still be deducted from the expense of maintenance of boats or motorboats, engines, fishing gears.

2.7 Theory of Transaction Costs

Williamson's transaction costs are costs for running the economic system and the costs of adjusting for environmental changes (Dorfman, 1981; Challen, 2000; as quoted by Mburu 2002: 41). In summary, transaction costs are costs for negotiating a measure, and imposing an exchange. Whereas according to Mburu (2002: 42), transaction costs can also be interpreted to include three broader categories, namely: (1) search and information costs; (2) the cost of negotiation (bargaining) and the decision to execute a contract; and (3) costs of supervision (monitoring), coercion, and fulfillment / compliance (compliance). Furubotn and Richter (as quoted by Benham and Benham, 2000: 368) show that transaction costs are the costs of using the market and costs using the right to give orders within the company. For each of the three types of transaction costs can be distinguished according to two types, namely: Fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs According to Djodipuro (1991: 77), production costs are expenses; but not all expenditures constitute production costs. To meet these costs, an expenditure must meet several conditions. These conditions are 1) unavoidable, 2) Predictable, and 3) Can be stated quantitatively.

3. RESEARCH METHODS

The type of research that will be used in this study is a type of qualitative descriptive research. Qualitative descriptive research is a method in research concerning the state of human status, an object, a set of conditions, a system of thought or a class of events in the present and describes a poverty study of a variable, knowing the interrelationship between these various variables. In this case, various variables have a relationship or relationship between fisherman poverty and the physical aspects of space. This study uses a life history approach (Suharto, 1993: 35). The unit of analysis in the study is the behavior of the executing institutional actors in the village of Puger Wetan, Puger District, Jember Regency. The population in this study were all actors of the ambassador institution in the village of Puger Wetan, Puger District, Jember City. The sample was taken nonrandom which is intentional (proporsive sample) using the snow balling method. The quality and quantity of samples is determined by the saturation of information.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Puger Fishermen Community Social Structure

Social structure is a social process that involves relationships between humans that form a level. This relationship occurs continuously so that the community is structured like an organization. In the context of fishermen in the coast of Puger Wetan area of Puger District, there are several social structures that are very distinct. The first is the social structure because of fishing gear, namely "Jukung boat fishing groups" and large boat fishing groups. The two groups generally inclave each other and each group has an emotional attachment when they face each other. Some causes include: differences in socio-economic

conditions, large boat groups generally economically more capable, socially having greater social capital and networks. Technically, boat *delajah*, production capacity capability results to different benefits. Based on the characteristics of property rights and their authority, the social structure of the fishing community is divided into three levels, namely (a) owner fishermen (landlords); (b) labor fishermen (sea lords) and (c) *pandhega* (ABK). The difference between the first two social structures is only in ship ownership and operational management. Owner fishers (landlords) are shipowners who have the right to regulate the operation of the fish caught. Marine boat (boat captain) is a person who is trusted to operate ships from fishermen owners while *Pandhega* is ABK workers who are workers on the ship. In addition to the three social structures above, there are other parties whose role is very large for the fishermen, both the owners and fishermen of the laborers, namely the *Pangambeg*. The social closeness built by fishermen and *pengambek* has been established for a long time, even though it is only a loan of money (debt / capital). This loan is another and arguably unique from other loan lending agreements. This relationship began when the owner of the boat owner borrowed a certain amount of capital for the need to go fishing from the *pengambeg* without providing any guarantees, then from this loan there was an unwritten agreement between the boss and the boatman where the boat owner must market the catch to the *pengambeg*. Usually there are no fishermen who violate this agreement because the norm and social law of the community of *Puger Wetan Village* is quite high. Then for each basket that the fisherman hands over to the *pengambeg*, Rp. 1,000 / basket as a calculation of the interest of a fisherman loan. *Pangambeg* in *Puger Wetan Village* can be classified into two groups, namely big *pangambeg* and small *pengambeg*. The big snob is a scout who lends money to all groups of fishermen in large numbers and also sells fish with large parties. While the small scout is a scout who lends money to small numbers of fishermen. In carrying out lending activities, the connoisseurs strongly maintain a single bond with the fishermen they provide loans. Sometimes the *Pangambeg* do not want or refuse if the fishermen want to pay off their debts, this is done with the aim that the bond between *pengambek* and fishermen still occurs.

4.2 Institutional Analysis of *Pangambeg*

Institution can be seen from 3 main things, namely: (1) Jurisdictional Boundary, (2) Rights and Obligations (Property Right) and (3) Rule of Representation. The patron-client relationship in the fishing community of *Puger Wetan* in *Jember Regency* has been institutionalized, this is due to the patron-client relationship is a complex system and includes habits that can not be separated from the behavior system and the environment. There are rights and obligations which are the jurisdiction limits of each actor. The Obligatory *Pangambeg* is to provide assistance or loans in the form of a sum of money to Landlords for venture capital to purchase boats, fishing gear, machinery and other equipment. The obligation of Landlords is to deliver fish catches to *Pengambeg*. The rights of the scavenger are to receive the catch from the landlord at a price determined by *Pengambeg*. The Right to Own Land is to get a guarantee of the market certainty of fish catches and capital requirements for production facilities in the form

of boats, fishing gear, machinery and other equipment or some money for boat repairs. The obligation of the Landlord is to provide boats, machinery and fishing gear and provide a guarantee of life during famine in the form of money for daily needs. *Pandhega's* obligation is to devote himself to assisting in the business of Landlord in relation to fishing operations. The right of the landlord is to receive the share of results from each component of the production facilities provided. The rights to *pandhega* are to obtain the results of the sea fishing from Skipper as part of the production factor. The limits of the authority of each actor show that the *Pengekek* holds the role of full authority in determining the price of fish catches. The authority of the landlord is to get guaranteed market certainty about fish catches and business capital needs. The fish caught is owned by the landlord, but the *Pangambeg* has the authority so that the landlord does not sell the fish caught to other *pengambeg*. This is because there is an attachment to accounts payable to *Pengambeg*. Whereas for the ownership limit, it is indicated by evidence that landowners can decide for themselves various matters relating to business activities, in terms of arranging their subordinates in fishing activities, among others about fishing areas and profit sharing systems with *pandhega*. However, the decision regarding the selling price of fish is a decision by the *Pangambeg*.

4.3 Relationship between *Pangambeg* and Fishermen

4.3.1 Catch Distribution System

The status of fishermen found in the *Puger coastal community* is the type of fisherman status, namely:

- (1) Landman: that is, a person who owns a boat and a fishing gear, but does not participate in fishing operations at sea. A land guard only receives profit sharing from the catch as a reward for the capture unit which is sought by another person.
- (2) Land-sea jets: namely people who own boats and fishing equipment and also participate in fishing operations. Profit sharing received from the proceeds as a fisherman and profit sharing as the owner of the capture;
- (3) Marine businessman: that is a person who does not have a boat and fishing equipment, but he is responsible for operational fishing in the sea as a ship controller (captain and guide to the position and movement of fish in the sea) and;
- (4) Labor / *Pandega*: i.e. people who do not have an arrest unit and only function as crew members. This labor or *pandega* generally receives profit sharing from the catch and daily wages;

Tabel 4.1. The profit sharing system for *jukung boat fishermen*

No	Fisherman Status	Number of people	Share	Sum
1.	Landman	1	50% from the results of fishing	50% from the results of fishing
2.	Marine businessman	1	1,5	1,5
3.	<i>Pandhega</i>	1	1	1

Source: Data Observe 2018

Marine traders get 1.5 parts of 50% (fifty percent) of the share for a pandhega and a sea lord from the benefits of fishing activities, the portion of the sea lord is higher than the third, because a sea lord has greater responsibility when fishing. The Pandhega gets 1 (one part) from 50% (fifty percent) part for a third person and sea owner from the profit of sea activities. The activities of livelihood in the form of fishing in the sea carried out by fishermen in their lives experience a lot of uncertainty. That is what causes the need for institutions that regulate the distribution of the sale of fish catches from fishing activities. The revenue sharing system is a norm or rule that has developed into an institution that functions to regulate the relationship between bosses and pandhega / labor / ABK in terms of the distribution of catches from the sea they do. This institution is a social asset that is contained in a community and in particular in relation to the skipper and pandega / labor / ABK in production activities.

4.3.2 Pandhega and Network Marketing

The fish caught by indirect fishermen are sold at the place of fish auction but are sold to the Pangambeg at a predetermined selling price, therefore the TPI facility at PPI Puger does not work according to its function. fisherman laborers do not participate in selling fish catches, the decision to sell fish is left to the skipper, and the price determined by the Pangambeg can not sell fish to the market due to the existence of a system of debts that occurs between skipper and Pangambeg. In general, the Pangambeg have a relationship with the big traders who are outside so they know where the catch will be sold. However, there are some Pangambeg who use intermediary services to sell their fish to wholesalers or processing companies outside the area. The Puger area does not have a fish processing industry so this is an excuse for Pangambeg to sell their fish to traders outside Puger. Inadequate facilities at PPI Puger and less advanced technology are factors that cause the absence of processing industries in the Puger area. The profits taken by the intermediary are in accordance with the mutual agreement. The relationship between fishermen and pangambeg cannot be separated. Because fishermen are not trusted by the bank in terms of financial loans, many fishermen are turning to pengekek. The financial needs of large numbers of fishermen can be fulfilled by pangambeg in a short time. Fishermen prefer to sell the catch to the pangambeg compared to the big traders / companies. The ability of the sniper to pay off the price of the catches of the fishermen compared to the big traders is the reason the fishermen sell the catch.

4.3.3 Pengambeg and Informal microfinance institutions

The term pengambeg is a community term in referring to fish brokers in Puger Kulon and Puger Wetan Villages. In almost every coastal area of Puger, both in Puger Kulon Village and Puger Wetan, there are traditional financial institutions of Pengambeg which take several roles in developing in the informal fisheries and marine sector. Not only the financial sector that is entered into by pengambeg but also in the production, marketing and social sectors. In

the production sector, pengambeg takes a role in providing fishing production facilities, such as: providing fishing gear, providing provision for fishing and fishing vessels. Whereas in the marketing sector, fish caught by fishermen where these locations do not have a Fish Auction Place (TPI), so generally the Scavengers will buy fish catches which later by pengambeg will be channeled to exporters or local markets. The sector that is considered to have an important role by fishermen with the presence of Pengambek is in the financial sector, where all needs in the form of finance so that fishing business activities will be provided by pengambeg most of the fishermen depend on pengambeg. He will provide financial assistance to its fishermen members without certain conditions unlike formal financial institutions (banking). In the Debt system Receivables from those who lend money to the community in Puger Wetan Village are landlords and pengambeg. The party who provides loans to landlords is a scout. The amount of the loan to the owner of the jukung boat ranges from 5-15 million (depending on the need for more). Compensation from the loan is that the landlord must sell the catch to the pengekek at the selling price determined by the scavenger. A landlord who has a debt to a pengambeg, he will be bound to sell the fish to a pengambek at a price determined by a scout The price set by the pengambeg still has to be deducted by Rp. 1000 per kg of fish, so for example the price of cakal fish is Rp. 25,000 per kg then what is given to landlords is Rp. 24,000 - per kg. This bond is established in accordance with the agreement between fishermen and pengambeg. Sometimes even though fishermen want to pay off the debt of the pengambeg, they don't want to pay off their debt. So the bond remains intertwined. Whereas the party that gives loans to the captain and crew is a landlord. The amount of loans provided by Skipper boat owners to fishermen and captain is between 1-2 million rupiah. The amount of the loan given depends on the trustworthiness and expertise of his subordinates. There is even a captain who pawns his expertise to borrow money from a skipper. Accounts payable between a scamper and a landlord, and a landlord with a sea lord or crew, will never be billed, as long as they are still bound to cooperate. Debt will be collected if the landlord moves the turtle or crew to replace the skipper.

4.4 Pengambeg and Patronage

Institutional patronage is an institution that grows and develops from the fishing community itself. . The ties of these relations are hereditary which are formed by the present generation, related to cooperative relations formed by past generations as pioneers of cooperative ties formed by the next generation. Institutions develop according to the increasingly complex problems faced by the community. Basically, every form of institution regulates three things, namely mastery, utilization and transfer of resources. The diversity that is the impact of the workings of an institution is very dependent on how the institution regulates these three things. In order for the impact to function properly, institutions must be sufficiently established for a certain period of time. The impact of various institutional alternatives is important information in estimating economic and social developments in fishing communities in the future. The structure of the pattern of patronage institutional relationships in Puger Wetan Village consists of two levels,

namely the level of the relationship between the pengambang and the landlord and skipper with the pandega. The following is a study of the structure of patronage institutional relations patterns (pengambang, skipper and pandega).

4.5 Relationship Patterns of Land Skipper and Pandega

Relations between fishermen and laborers or the relationship between fishermen in a group of boats generally still have family, friends or neighbors, the relationship formed is based on family relationships, now more economic in nature. This is reflected in the withdrawal of workers who are no longer from relatives, close relatives, friends and neighbors. However, the recruitment of fishing workers is now taken from outside the Puger Kulon Village area such as from Grenden, Mlokorejo, Kasiyan, Kasiyan Timur, Wonosari, Jambearum, Bagon and Wringin Telu villages, the majority of which work in the agricultural sector. not a few fishermen workers were taken from outside the Puger District, for example from Wuluhan District, Balung and its surroundings. Although different villages and sub-districts of communication that occur between skipper and fisherman laborers can run smoothly, this is because each of the fishermen's workers already has a cellphone. The struggle for fishermen is due to a shortage of fishermen because fishermen cannot move to another employer, which results in a high competition for fishermen.

4.6 Analysis of Transaction Costs

The theory of transaction costs comes from a new economic institutional approach and focuses on institutional management. According to Williamson (1986) and Anwar (1995), the transaction cost economy is different from the neo-classical economy which considers economic activities do not experience significant obstacles because they have imperfect information. The real situation is that in every economic exchange process such as buying and selling, there are information barriers called transaction costs. These transaction costs can be classified into information costs, negotiation costs, contract costs, and monitoring costs. Information costs can be pre or before exchange, such as the cost of obtaining prices and products to be traded. Whereas negotiation costs are the costs of physical implementation of transactions that can be carried out such as commission fees, negotiation fees regarding terms of agreement regarding transactions, quality standards or payment arrangements that are binding to the parties to the transaction. Basically, each transaction relationship contains three basic economic components, namely:

- a. Value allocation or distribution of profits from exchanges.
- b. Allocations are uncertain and related risks.
- c. Ownership allocation that limits decision making in a relationship

An important problem that arises is not always a contract created with complete conditions, with the added presence of opportunities so that transaction costs always arise (Williamson, 1997) in Manzilati (2011). Economic transaction costs are defined based on three characteristics that fulfill transaction costs, namely asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transactions. The

characteristics of Social Status in Puger Wetan Village, Puger District, Jember Citu are based on the characteristics of the function, economy and institutions. Based on the function of the population's social status from the fishermen's perspective, it appears from two types of boats whether jukung or large boats. Based on work status, they are ambassadors, land bosses and sea lords. Generally, those who have high social status are landlords and land bosses or large prahu owners. The second social status is sea lords, while the third social worker is fishermen and boat owners. In general, social mobility and above only occur in landlords and landlords. Whereas fishermen workers tend to be stagnant or poor. The fishing community of Puger Wetan Village has a bad habit, which is like being indebted in fulfilling their daily needs. This habit of debt is not only done by fishermen workers, but also the boat owners do it. The influence of habits arranged in the behavior patterns of the fishing community has taken place for generations through a very long process of socialization. The habit of debt and not wanting to save as a cause of poverty that always shackles the lives of fishing communities in Puger Wetan Village. In the system of Obscene Debt borrowing lends large amounts of money to landlords. Compensation from the loan is to sell the catch to the pengambang at the selling price determined by the scavenger. This bond is established in accordance with the agreement between fishermen and pengambang. Sometimes even though the fishermen want to pay off the debt of the pengambang, they do not want to pay off the debt. So the bond remains intertwined. If all the debt is not repaid this will give a burden to the wife. Enduring shame is the biggest pressure on the wife. Debt debts between pengambang and land skipper, and land skipper with fishermen workers will never be billed, as long as they are still bound to cooperate. Debt will be collected if the landlord moves the turtle or crew to replace the skipper. This system of debt is clearly very binding and detrimental to fishermen, which in the end will further immerse fishermen in the abyss of poverty. It's like the result of this debt, fishermen are getting poorer. Thus, it is not excessive if the network of debts among fishermen households is very complex compared to other social groups. Cultural poverty experienced by fishing communities in Puger Wetan Village is essentially due to the inherited structural conditions by their ancestors who are already cultured and difficult to overcome. In addition to bad habits in the form of happy debts, most of the Puger Wetan fishing communities also have bad habits, which are very lazy, do not want to look for other alternative jobs when there is a bad season, like to live extravagantly, wasteful, drunk, unruly, do not have a sense of responsibility, irritability and stubbornness, has a high sense of prestige and accepting behavior towards fate that befalls itself and its community without trying to improve and develop oneself. These characteristics caused the fishing community in Puger Wetan Village to fall into cultural poverty.

5. CONCLUSION

The social structure of fishing communities in Puger village tends to be stagnant, those who can carry out vertical mobility are group of fishermen and owners of large boat or land bosses. The institutional function of pengambang and fishermen in Puger Wetan Village, Puger District, Jember

Regency has a very important role for the sustainability of the marine fishing industry, seen from the stability of supply, the lack of ambitiousness and the sustainability of fishermen's lives. The consequence of the institutional mechanism in maintaining the sustainability of the marine fishery economy system in Puger is the transaction costs that must be paid by each actor, which are generally win-win or lost if necessary (lost).

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