IJSTR >> Volume 9 - Issue 2, February 2020 Edition

[Full Text]

AUTHOR(S)

Arun Verma, Dr. A.B Kafaltiya, Dr. Desh Deepak Singh, Piyush, Dr. Shivani Sharma, Dr. Pankaj Srivastava

KEYWORDS

Brain Imaging, Freewill, Law, Neurolaw, Neuroscience.

ABSTRACT

Neurolaw is an interdisciplinary research program which aims not only to re-examine the axioms of law but also to enrich it in term of methodology and evidence. Although historically there are cases of application of neuroscience in the legal sphere, rapid growth has been recorded only after 1990. The radical debate in the field is between two perspectives i.e. neuroscience will show that we don’t have free will and this will lead to non-assignment of responsibility for actions including legal one and secondly, that neuroscience will show that humans have free will and thus there will be no changes in the legal system. In, this paper we will migrate from these theoretical arguments, to access the infield contribution of neuroscience to the legal system i.e. neurolaw.

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