Hardware Trojan Model For Attack And Detection Techniques
Ahmed Aliyu, Abdulaziz Bello, Usman Joda Mohammed, Ibrahim Hussaini Alhassan
Index Terms: Hardware Trojan, integrated circuits (Chips), Electronic design, techniques, Detection, bugs.
Abstract: Today's integrated circuits (ICs) are vulnerable to hardware Trojans, which are malicious alterations to the circuit, either during design or fabrication. The interventions of human in production of Hardware resources have given room for possible modification of hardware components, so as to achieve some malicious aims. This modification help with possible loop holes in the hardware component for later attack. Due to the increase in popularity aim of attacks using embedded Trojan horse programs into chips, attacker are more likely to suppress them with malicious program, also notwithstanding the increase in disintegration of the design and manufacturing process of our microelectronic products (ICs), we should not only concern about inclusion of unplanned, undesirable hardware features ("bugs"), rather about inclusion of planned malicious hardware features: "Trojan Horses," which act as spies or guerrillas. This paper presents a Model of the fundamental attacks and possible detection techniques of Hardware Trojan. The result of the research has shown a great significance in education and for further researches.
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